

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

14a

~~TOP SECRET~~

M
Action
SS

Info

Control: 2995

Rec'd: November 8, 1962
7:13 p.m.

EYES ONLY

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1688, November 8, 6 p.m.

14

E Y E S O N L Y

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1a 11/25/77
By JL, NARS, Date 8/11/77

NOYES CALLED ON RIKHYE AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO OBTAIN RUN-DOWN ON SYG'S MIT WITH KUZNETSOV AT 2:30 THIS AFTERNOON. SOV REPS SAID THAT ALL SO-CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAD BEEN LOADED ON NON-SOV SHIPS AND HAVE EITHER LEFT OR ARE ABOUT TO LEAVE. NO MORE SHIPS ARE NECESSARY. THEY ASKED WHAT NOW WAS PURPOSE OF INSPECTION OF INCOMING VESSELS BY ICRC AND FOR WHAT PERIOD. WHAT WOULD RELATIONS BE BETWEEN ICRC AND UN? WHAT SHIPS WOULD BE UTILIZED BY INSPECTORS AND WHAT FLAG WOULD SHIPS FLY?

SYG RESPONDED THAT ICRC HAD SET NUMBER CONDITIONS UPON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED. FIRST WAS THAT THREE PARTIES CONCERNED MUST CONSENT TO ARRANGEMENTS. US AND USSR HAD AGREED. HE STILL AWAITED CUBAN CONSENT. SECOND CONDITION WAS THAT ICRC WANTED TO OPERATE UNDER STRICT SET OF RULES IN VIEW OF UNUSUAL DEPARTURE FROM THEIR NORMAL PRACTICES AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) ICRC WOULD ONLY RECRUIT PERSONNEL FOR OPERATION.
- (2) THEY WOULD NOT PERMIT PERSONNEL TO WEAR RED CROSS BADGES NOR WOULD THEY PERMIT SHIPS TO FLY RED CROSS FLAG.
- (3) DURATION OF ARRANGEMENT MUST BE AGREED UPON BY THREE PARTIES CONCERNED.
- (4) ICRC WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROL OR COMMAND OF OPERATION. THIS MUST BE DONE BY UN. (RIKHYE INDICATED THAT THIS POSITION DIFFERED FROM SYG'S ORIGINAL VIEW WHICH HE

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1688, November 8, 6 p.m. from New York

UNDERSTOOD WAS ALSO OUR VIEW AND PROBABLY RUSSIAN VIEW THAT RED CROSS WOULD ASSUME SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES.)

SYG THEN MADE APPEAL TO USSR TO AGREE THAT UN WOULD TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL OF INSPECTION MACHINERY, PUT ITS OWN MEN ON SHIPS AND ELIMINATE RED CROSS ENTIRELY. HE INDICATED HE WAS READY TO START THIS PROCEDURE IMMEDIATELY IF USSR, US AND CUBA AGREED. HE SAID UN HAD NECESSARY PERSONNEL ON HAND. RIKHYE INDICATED SOV REPS GAVE NO REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL BUT SAID THEY WOULD FORWARD IT TO THEIR GOVT.

SYG THEN SUMMARIZED TO RUSSIANS HIS UNDERSTANDING OF STATUS OF NEGOTTS BETWEEN US AND USSR, EMPHASIZING PARTICULARLY ITEMS ON WHICH THERE WAS STILL DISAGREEMENT. HE THEN SAID HE HAD PROPOSAL TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THESE PROBLEMS, NAMELY THAT OF ON THE GROUND INSPECTION IN CUBA, ON WHICH PARTIES SEEMED VERY FAR APART. HE TOLD RUSSIANS THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE NEW PROPOSAL TO CASTRO TODAY WHICH CONTAINED FORMULATION TO REPLACE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ON THE SPOT INSPECTION WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY US AND USSR. HE WANTED HIS INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER TO BE KEPT STRICTLY CONF BUT EXPECTED REPS TO INFORM THEIR GOVTs. HE DID NOT INFORM THEM OF CONTENTS OF FORMULATION.

NOYES ASKED RIKHYE WHETHER HE COULD SAY ANYTHING MORE ABOUT FORMULATION. RIKHYE SAID HE COULD NOT FOR HE DID NOT KNOW HIMSELF. HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT CUBANS, WHO WERE NOW MTG WITH SYG, WOULD INFORM RUSSIANS IMMEDIATELY AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PLACED US AT SOME DISADVANTAGE. HE REQUESTED WE NOT INFORM KUZNETSOV THAT WE HAD RECEIVED ANY INFO CONCERNING SYG'S INITIATIVE.

SYG THEN TURNED IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIANS TO PROBLEM OF IL-28S. HE INFORMED THEM THAT HE HAD NOT FOUND ANY SOLUTION WHICH HE FELT WOULD HELP PARTIES TO GET OVER IMPASSE ON THIS QUESTION AND WAS THEREFORE NOT IN POSITION TO MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MATTER. STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 11/8/62, 7:21 PM.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE: Advance copies to SS 11-8-62 CWO-M. Passed to Principal Officers Executive Committee